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Introduction: Violence, Justice and the Work of Memory
Klaus Neumann, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia
Dan Anderson, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
The search for historical justice has become one of the defining features of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. So has the consensus about the 
need to remember the violence of past injustices and its victims. The search for justice is closely related to a focus on remembrance: the striving for justice 
relies on memories of injustices, and the public remembering of past wrongs is increasingly considered one crucial means of redressing such wrongs. This 
focus section brings together authors from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds in the humanities and social sciences, ranging from anthropology to law, and 
from cultural studies to political science. Focusing on post-conflict societies in Africa (Morocco, Rwanda), Asia (Nepal), Latin America (Argentina, Peru, Uru-
guay) and the Pacific (Solomon Islands), the papers explore aspects of the work of memory in attempts to redress past wrongs and make the present inhabit-
able. This introduction also extends some of the themes that connect the seven individual papers.
How do the survivors of human rights violations, and the 
families of victims, remember those disappeared or mur-
dered? What is the relationship between individual mem-
ories and public memorialisation and forgetting? How are 
memories mobilised in attempts to redress past wrongs? 
These are among the central questions addressed in this 
focus section. They are important not least because the 
search for historical justice – for the retrospective righting 
of past wrongs – has become one of the defining features of 
our age.
On 23 April 2014, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan issued a statement in which he acknowledged the 
suffering of Armenians in the course of what he called “the 
events of 1915”. According to an “unofficial translation” 
published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Erdoğan said: “[W]e wish that the Armenians who lost 
their lives in the context of the early twentieth century rest 
in peace, and we convey our condolences to their grand-
children.” (Republic of Turkey 2014) The statement was 
released on the eve of the ninety-ninth anniversary of the 
first day of mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire. Between 1915 and 1923, up to one and a half mil-
lion Armenians lost their lives in what is, outside of Turkey, 
referred to as the Armenian genocide; most of the surviv-
ing Armenian population was deported from their ances-
tral homelands in Asia Minor.
Erdoğan’s statement was welcomed as a step in the right 
direction by the United States government, but met with 
criticism both in neighbouring Armenia and by Armenian 
organisations around the world. That was hardly surprising, 
as it fell well short of an official apology, did not mention the 
word “genocide”, and implied that the suffering of Arme-
nians was no greater than that of other ethnic groups in the 
dying days of the Ottoman Empire, including Turks, Arabs 
The idea for this focus section was conceived at the 
“Historical Justice and Memory” emerging scholars 
workshop held at the Swinburne Institute for Social 
Research, Swinburne University of Technology, in 
2012. We thank the workshop’s participants for their 
contributions, and Swinburne University and the 
Australian Research Council for funding it. We also 
thank all those whose papers were shortlisted for 
this section for commenting on the work of other 
prospective contributors. Finally, we would like to 
acknowledge the guidance of the twenty-seven 
reviewers who generously refereed papers for us, and 
thank the two anonymous reviewers of this intro-
duction for their observations and suggestions.
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and Kurds. According to Armenia’s president Serzh Sarki-
sian, the statement reflected Turkey’s “policy of utter denial”. 
He claimed that not only is Turkey the successor of the Otto-
man Empire, but the “denial of a crime constitutes the direct 
continuation of that very crime” (Guardian, 24 April 2014).
At the time of writing this introduction, Erdoğan’s condol-
ences and the attention they garnered were merely the 
latest of many recent instances in which attempts to pro-
vide redress for past injustices attracted significant inter-
national attention. Ninety-nine years after the beginning of 
the Armenian genocide, calls for symbolic and material 
redress for the injustices perpetrated against Armenians are 
increasing, rather than decreasing in volume, and the inter-
national support for such calls is growing. These and many 
similar calls suggestthat the – already formidable – move-
ment for historical justice is only gaining in strength.
Already there is hardly a government that could afford to 
ignore demands for historical justice, be it because of 
domestic or because of international pressure. Politicians 
also increasingly feel compelled to take a stance in relation 
to historic wrongs that happened elsewhere. Thus, govern-
ments and national and state parliaments around the world 
have officially recognised that the “events of 1915” con-
stituted a genocide. For example, in 1997, the Australian 
state parliament of New South Wales passed a motion in 
which it condemned the genocide and designated “24 April 
in every year hereafter throughout New South Wales as a 
day of remembrance of the 1.5 million Armenians who fell 
victim to the first genocide of this century” (Parliament of 
New South Wales 1997, 7739). Erdoğan was obviously con-
scious of the international dimensions of his statement, 
since it was published in nine languages. In fact, it could be 
argued that his statement was directed neither towards 
Armenians nor intended for a domestic audience, but was 
targeted at Europe and constituted a blatant attempt to 
address reservations about Turkey’s bid to join the Euro-
pean Union.
Most of the historic wrongs that prompt calls for justice 
took place within living memory; but there are increasingly 
others which, like the Armenian genocide, happened sev-
eral generations ago. The time lag hardly diminishes the 
potency of their legacy. At the other end of the spectrum, 
there are calls for historical justice in instances in which 
conflicts and associated human rights violations are 
ongoing. For example, at a time when an end to the civil 
war in Syria does not seem imminent, international 
organisations are already positioning themselves to advise a 
post-Assad government on how best to provide redress for 
injustices committed since the beginning of the hostilities.1 
Current international discussions about human rights viol-
ations in Syria seem to focus as much on how to hold per-
petrators to account after the end of the conflict as on how 
to alleviate the suffering of its victims now.
Today’s movement for historical justice has its origins in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, with the war 
crimes trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo being the most vis-
ible examples of attempts in the second half of the 1940s to 
hold the perpetrators of historic wrongs accountable, but it 
did not gain momentum until the early 1980s.2 It was only 
from the late 1990s that the movement for historical justice 
attracted sustained attention from scholars, particularly in 
political science, law and moral philosophy, with Martha 
Minow (1998), Elazar Barkan (2000), Gary Bass (2000), 
Ruti Teitel (2000), Lawrence Douglas (2001), Priscilla 
Hayner (2002) and Janna Thompson (2002) being the 
most influential pioneers in the English-speaking world.
The acceleration of the movement for historical justice in 
the early 1980s was partly due to a growing consensus to 
publicly remember historical injustices and its victims. 
1 As early as March 2012, the Public International 
Law and Policy Group released a report to “provide 
recommendations for measures that an interim 
Syrian government could take in the days immedi-
ately following President Bashar al-Assad’s depar-
ture” (2012, 1). Similarly, in 2013 the International 
Center for Transitional Justice released a briefing 
paper by its vice president, Paul Seils, in which he 
argues for the creation of a “nationally owned and 
respected process that embraces and promotes the 
possibility of engendering a rights-respecting society 
through truth, justice, reparations, and reform” 
(Seils 2013, 3–4).
2 In the following, we provide a necessarily potted 
history of historical justice and the public remem-
brance of historic wrongs. For detailed accounts, see, 
for example, Elster 2004; Hazan 2010; Méndez 2011; 
Sikkink 2011; and Teitel 2011; see also Neumann 
2014.
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This consensus also had its origins in the second half of the 
1940s, and it also slowly developed in stops and starts, 
before gaining significant momentum in the late 1970s. 
The insistence that the victims of mass violence and other 
injustices needed to be remembered soon went hand in 
hand with demands that perpetrators needed to be held 
accountable and that victims were entitled to reparations.
In the tradition of the postwar war crimes trials, historical 
justice was initially synonymous with retributive justice. 
From the 1980s, however, the focus shifted from the perpe-
trators to the victims, and from retribution to repair. Gov-
ernments and civil society actors demanding historical 
justice also became increasingly concerned to bring at least 
some of the perpetrators, and, more importantly, the 
majority of their supporters, back into the fold, as it were, 
and aimed for reconciliation as well as accountability.
Perpetrators who deny their crimes and refuse to repent 
could still be prosecuted and convicted, but they cannot be 
part of a successful process of reconciliation. Reconcili-
ation is premised on an acknowledgment of wrongs. Such 
an acknowledgment in turn requires ready access to knowl-
edge about the exact nature and extent of the wrong in 
question. Thus the reparative turn of the movement for 
historical justice was accompanied by the recognition that 
the victims of historic wrongs, as well as society at large, 
have the right to learn the truth about these wrongs. 
Knowledge of the truth on its own, however, was not con-
sidered sufficient either to satisfy the demand for justice or 
to prevent a recurrence of injustices. Rather, certain aspects 
of the truth – in particular, the names of the victims and 
details of their suffering – needed to be permanently, or at 
least regularly, publicly acknowledged. Commemorations, 
memorials and museums are means to ensure that a post-
conflict rapprochement is underpinned by a lasting 
acknowledgment of the human cost of the violence. In fact, 
such an acknowledgment is now widely regarded to be an 
integral part of the act of repair in post-conflict situations.
Erdoğan’s statement was quickly dismissed because he sug-
gested it was possible to separate truth from justice and 
remembrance, claiming that: “In today’s world, deriving 
enmity from history and creating new antagonisms are 
neither acceptable nor useful for building a common 
future” (Republic of Turkey 2014). His statement reflects 
an anachronistic understanding of the conditions of peace, 
which had remained largely uncontested until the early 
twentieth century. In his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo Gro-
tius, one of the fathers of international law, had advised the 
parties to a conflict to make peace without seeking repar-
ations and dwelling on the roots of the conflict, and by 
aiming to forget historical enmities: “And the most latent 
and remote causes are supposed to be included in the most 
general terms, in treaties of peace, whereby they are sunk in 
oblivion.” (Grotius 2001, 349) However, for Turkish over-
tures to be accepted by Armenians, they need to be accom-
panied by reparations (however symbolic these may be) 
and by a willingness to remember the nature of the viol-
ence of 1915. This is not least because Armenians them-
selves have remembered the “events of 1915” as a genocide, 
and they have done so publicly. Each year, the anniversary 
on 24 April is a day of remembrance in Armenia, and the 
occasion of public events in the Armenian diaspora, 
including marches and ceremonies in places such as 
Ottawa, Los Angeles and Paris. According to the online 
Armenian Genocide Memorials Database (http://www.
armenian-genocide.org/memorials.html), today there are 
166 memorials to the genocide, which are spread over 
thirty-one countries.
In public discussions about historical justice and memory, 
the latter is usually associated with official acknowledge-
ments, commemorative rituals, museums, memorials, 
documentaries and feature films, and artistic and literary 
representations of the past. Much less attention is paid to 
how injustices are being remembered individually – by 
those most directly affected by them, but also by others. 
Erdoğan’s message was ostensibly directed at the grand-
children of Armenians alive in 1915. How do they 
remember the violence of ninety-nine years ago? Their 
memories may not so much focus on the unimaginable fig-
ure of one and a half million dead, but on a great-aunt who 
can be named, or on a village community that now only 
exists in the diasporic imagination.
The authors of the following seven papers are mainly con-
cerned with the impact of violence on individuals, and with 
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the work of memory performed by them, while at the same 
time acknowledging that their search for justice and their 
attempts to remember the dead have to be seen in the con-
text of larger, public discourses. In the next section we give 
an overview of the themes canvassed in this focus section.
1. Contributions to this Focus Section
Our belonging to and with others determines who we are. 
Relationships allow us to recognise ourselves, and to be 
recognised. Whenever a relative, neighbour or friend dies, 
we reconstitute, however slightly, our selves. Survivors of a 
genocide, having lost scores of people close to them, face a 
particularly daunting challenge: not only do the dead have 
a claim on them – namely to be remembered – but they 
have lost those upon whom they could ground their 
claims for recognition and identity. In many ways, this is 
at the heart of the moral injury experienced by survivors: 
they lose themselves because they have lost the tacit 
assumptions about who they are in relation to those 
around them.
In her contribution to this focus section, Laura Eramian 
(2014) writes about Tutsi survivors of the genocide in the 
Rwandan town of Butare, who are confronted by a radical 
devastation of the social economy within which individuals 
locate their identity. She identifies two means by which sur-
vivors respond to that injury: an economy of exchange 
with the dead based on traditional practices and beliefs 
about the obligations of the living toward those who have 
died; and an informal conversational practice of recalling 
the details of the lost to other members of the community. 
Both practices buttress socially-constituted identity: the 
exchange practices through maintaining a limited form of 
lost identity-constitutive relations; the recall of those lost 
to others as a means of locating the speaker’s belonging to 
the broader community through a demonstrated compet-
ency in plotting its social networks.
Eramian’s work differs from that of authors who have 
studied the politics of memory in post-conflict contexts to 
account for the role of narratives of the past in the 
formation of national identity and in peace building. In 
Rwandan society the political stakes of memory are high. 
As Eramian notes, the individual self-making practices of a 
Butare resident cannot be divorced from the politics of 
coming to terms with the violent past. However, the mem-
ory practices carried out through exchange rituals and the 
conversational impulse to recount losses are not oriented 
towards a proximate political goal. Rather, they are com-
pensatory practices aimed at maintaining personhood. By 
contrast, psycho-social approaches to memory in post-con-
flict situations focus on the role of therapeutic practices, 
such as truth-telling, in healing the ongoing effects of mass 
violence at both an individual and a community level. 
While the memory practices that Eramian outlines are 
compensatory and reparative, they differ from therapeutic 
practices in that they do not aim for catharsis, or a restora-
tion to normal functioning before the moral injury. They 
are directed at the maintenance or reconstitution of per-
sonhood rather than at the healing of injury.
Jill Stockwell (2014), too, is concerned with the effects of 
violence on those who have lost loved ones. Her article 
engages with the oral testimonies of two communities of 
women who remember experiences of violence in the 
1970s and 1980s in Argentina. While one group of women 
has been affected by the state terrorism perpetrated under 
the military dictatorship (1976–1983), members of the 
other group mourn loved ones who were killed by leftist 
guerillas before the military junta came to power.
Argentina pioneered transitional justice mechanisms, 
including those intended to facilitate reparative memory 
work. Yet, according to Stockwell, there is little evidence 
that these mechanisms have fostered national reconcili-
ation or even consensus regarding a narrative of 
Argentina’s violent past. Despite the claims that public 
memorialisation and the sharing of victims’ oral testimony 
will produce psycho-social healing and political trans-
formation, the two groups of women studied by Stockwell 
remain, decades after the putative end of the conflict in 
Argentina, deeply divided and hostile towards one another. 
Stockwell argues that in Argentina political divisions have 
become entrenched around different ways of remembering 
the violent past so that, rather than being reparative, mem-
orial practices are often feeding further conflict. She argues 
that this failure is the result of inadequate attention to the 
pre-political dynamics at work in the production, trans-
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mission and endurance of memories within different 
memory communities, and to the role that emotion and 
affect play in the shaping of shared memory.
For the women in Stockwell’s study, the continuing effects 
of trauma manifest themselves as “deep memory”; a mem-
ory triggered by powerful associations with particular sen-
sations. The smell of blood or the accidental sight of an old 
wedding photo is capable of unpredictably breaking in 
upon the thought world of a survivor and causing them to 
relive past suffering. The result is an ongoing instability 
and vulnerability of the survivors’ reconstructed sense of 
themselves. These deep memories resist the closure prof-
fered by truth-telling: they appear to take the victim back 
to the experience of the original wrong and therefore pre-
vent the therapeutic effect of re-narration in a new context, 
which allows for a reversal of the moral import of the 
injury. Stockwell argues that for survivors of mass violence 
who live with the continuing trauma of deep memory, the 
psycho-social emphasis on healing the trauma might inap-
propriately over-estimate the extent to which closure is 
possible. 
This has crucial implications for the project of reparative 
memory work in Argentina. Shared affectual relations 
towards past events (and opposition to alternative ways of 
remembering) function as pivots around which a com-
munal identity is organised. The groups studied by Stock-
well share a particular emotional orientation towards the 
past and strong negative emotions towards rival commu-
nities of memory. Stockwell also identifies a process of 
affective transmission: emotional orientations are trans-
mitted between members of a community in the process of 
recalling and sharing their memories.
While Eramian and Stockwell are concerned with the 
memories and coping strategies of people who have lost 
loved ones through acts of communal, terrorist or state-
sanctioned violence, Laura Menin (2014) writes about sur-
vivors who try to make sense of and communicate 
experiences of victimisation – although she also engages 
with the issue of how political violence affects those close 
to its direct victims. She focuses on two individuals, Nour-
eddine Saoudi and Fatna El Bouih, former political 
prisoners during the so-called Years of Lead in Morocco. 
Saoudi and El Bouih both experienced forced disappear-
ance and detention in the 1970s and 1980s, and both wrote 
memoirs about their time in prison. Their texts form part 
of an emerging “prison literature” in Morocco that 
attempts to challenge official accounts of the period of 
oppression during the reign of Morocco’s autocratic ruler, 
Hassan II.
Menin’s research shows that for Saoudi and El Bouih the 
movement from a personal memory of violence to a public 
testimony has been part of the reassertion of their iden-
tities, not least as political activists. Both speak of the peda-
gogical intent of their memoirs. This intent is clearly not 
distinct from its therapeutic effect. The process of re-nar-
ration invests the experiences with a new meaning, allow-
ing the fresh articulation of memories to also function as a 
mode of re-asserting their own subjectivity and undoing 
the effects of attempts to “erase” them in prison (Slyo-
movics 2005, 132). 
Menin interweaves a textual analysis of the prison memoirs 
with conversations and interviews with Saoudi and El 
Bouih in order to detect instances in which silence shrouds 
aspects of their experience. The cultural expectations of 
masculinity and femininity, and the notions of shame, 
decency and modesty, modulate the articulation of their 
memories in ways that can have significant implications for 
the pursuit of therapeutic or political reparation. These 
dynamics, particularly in relation to gender and sexual 
violence, remain submerged but nevertheless lend form to 
the transformation of memory from perceptual experience 
to public testimony. In the cases of Saoudi and El Bouih we 
once again uncover a pursuit of reconstructed identity at 
the individual level, shaped of course by social norms, but 
in turn significantly shaping the content and the practice of 
shared memory carried out at the social and political level.
While the first three papers are concerned with the memory 
practices of individuals – albeit often in response to public 
memories or operating within the “social frames” 
(Halbwachs 1925) of memory – the next two contributions 
are about the politics of memory at a national or supra-
national level. Maria Chiara Campisi’s (2014) article exam-
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ines the jurisprudence underpinning the use of 
commemoration and memorialisation initiatives in repar-
ation orders imposed under international human rights law. 
In the past, narrowly targeted forms of reparation focused 
largely on restitution or the financial compensation of indi-
viduals. According to Campisi, in response to therapeutic 
and community-oriented paradigms, a shift in international 
human rights jurisprudence has seen the emergence of legal 
remedies based on practices developed within the field of 
transitional justice, including court-ordered commem-
orations and memorialisations.
This shift has been pioneered by two international institu-
tions: the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
whose special rapporteurs Theo van Boven and Mahmoud 
Cherif Bassiouni championed the adoption of a document 
setting out a right to the truth, the so-called Van Boven-
Bassiouni Principles, by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 2005 (United Nations 2006; see also Bassiouni 
2006 and van Boven 2010); and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, which has imposed commemoration 
initiatives as part of reparation orders based on an inter-
pretation of the reparative model set out in that document. 
Campisi suggests that the Inter-American Court has been 
moving beyond judicial arbitration and sees itself as a cata-
lyst for more widespread reparative memory work.
Campisi pays particular attention to an order the court 
made in 2006, which required the Peruvian government to 
publicly acknowledge responsibility for human rights viol-
ations perpetrated by its agents against inmates of the 
Miguel Castro-Castro prison in 1992. Many of the victims 
were associated with the paramilitary armed group Partido 
Comunista del Perú (Sendero Luminoso), who were 
responsible for much of the violence that gripped Peru 
between 1980 and 2000 and subsequently became the sub-
ject of an investigation by a truth and reconciliation com-
mission. The court ordered Peru to commemorate prison 
inmates killed by the security forces in 1992 by including 
their names on a monument in Lima, Lika Mutal’s El Ojo 
que Llora (“The Eye that Cries”). This order prompted 
strong reactions, including a vandalising of the monument. 
Campisi suggests that the court was somewhat naïve in rea-
soning that since the prisoners were the victims of state-
sanctioned violence, they too ought to be remembered by 
inscribing their names on the memorial. As a result, 
according to Campisi, the court’s initiative exacerbated 
political conflict instead of contributing to social repair.
The details of the Miguel Castro-Castro case and the effects 
within Peruvian society produced by the court-ordered 
commemoration have parallels in Francesca Lessa’s (2014) 
study of another public acknowledgement ordered by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: the 2012 Public 
Act of Acknowledgment of International Responsibility 
and Recovery of the Memory of María Claudia García de 
Gelman in Uruguay. Lessa’s article bypasses the question of 
the legal basis or propriety of the court order and focuses 
instead on the details of the Public Act and its impact on 
Uruguayan narratives of the violent past. 
The case that formed the basis for the court’s order to the 
Uruguayan government began with the forced disappear-
ance of María Claudia García and her husband Marcelo Gel-
man in 1976. For two decades, Marcelo’s father Juan 
Gelman sought information concerning their fate. His 
search revealed that María Claudia had given birth while in 
military detention; that María Claudia and Marcelo Gelman 
died while imprisoned; and that the baby girl had been 
given to the family of a police chief. The girl (known as 
Macarena) was eventually located in Montevideo. Sub-
sequently Macarena and her grandfather Juan Gelman pur-
sued the Uruguayan government for further information 
about the fate of María Claudia and Marcelo and the 
location of any remains. When these efforts failed, they took 
their concerns to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.
The Gelmans’ story is powerfully entwined with that of a 
country attempting to come to terms with political viol-
ence in its recent past. The Gelman case unsettled official 
accounts of the nature of the military dictatorship, and a 
seemingly consensual decision not to hold state actors 
accountable for human rights violations perpetrated at the 
time. It brought unresolved memory contests between con-
temporary actors in Uruguayan society to the surface, ulti-
mately provoking a reconfiguration of the narratives 
circulating in Uruguay to explain the violent past. 
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Although the Gelman case was triggered by the attempt of 
two individuals to appropriately remember close relations 
and to “reconstitute their personhood”, to use the vocabu-
lary employed by Eramian, it resulted in changes to the 
“social frames” that shape individual memories.
The last two papers take us back to individual coping mech-
anisms. They address the issue of the interplay between 
larger national or supra-national projects to bring about 
historical justice, on the one hand, and the attempts of indi-
viduals affected by historical injustices to make their world 
inhabitable, on the other. Louise Vella (2014) provides a 
critical analysis of the work of the Solomon Islands Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). She argues that 
practices of reconciliation in Solomon Islands are shaped by 
kastom, a postcolonial reaffirmation of supposedly tradi-
tional cultural practices that is common to contemporary 
Melanesian societies (see, for example, Forsyth 2009). Kas-
tom defines what counts as socially destructive behaviour, 
the correct mechanisms for social repair, and what can and 
cannot be said about past violence.
The Solomon Islands TRC was established to deal with the 
aftermath of a conflict known locally as the Tensions, 
which pitted people from the island of Guadalcanal against 
those from Malaita, with state actors also playing a role in 
the violence. The TRC was set up to promote nation-
 building and a consensual memory of the events of the 
Tensions. “Pre-packaged solutions are ill-advised”, the 
United Nations Secretary-General found in 2004 in a 
report about transitional justice. “Instead, experiences 
from other places should simply be used as a starting point 
for local debates and decisions” (United Nations 2004, 7). 
Vella’s work suggests that, at least in Solomon Islands, the 
Secretary-General’s advice was not heeded. Her central 
contention is that the effectiveness of the TRC was seri-
ously compromised by a failure to adequately adapt seem-
ingly generic transitional justice practices to the local 
context and to recognise the effects of ideas of kastom-
based reparative justice on the TRC’s work. Vella argues 
that the TRC uncritically adopted the assumption (based 
on global transitional justice discourse) that truth-telling is 
in itself and on its own reparative and failed to recognise 
that this assumption does not hold in the context of local 
reparative justice practice.
The political work of memory in the Solomon Islands, the 
idea that reparative justice at the national level can be fur-
thered by a consensual memory, and that reparations at the 
psycho-social level can be furthered by providing victims 
with an opportunity to tell their stories, is complicated in 
the Solomon Islands by the expectations of a system of rep-
arative justice in which truth-telling is not seen as benefi-
cial per se. Vella’s interviews reveal that the documenting of 
local memories of violence was perceived as part of a sym-
bolic exchange between local communities and the govern-
ment. Memories were not offered as contributions to a 
national peace-building project, or to heal individual or 
collective trauma, but as tokens in an exchange process. 
Solomon Islanders perceived the government’s failure to 
release the TRC’s final report, and then – when it was 
leaked – to respond to its recommendations, as a betrayal 
of the terms of that exchange.
We conclude this focus section with a contribution which 
once more focuses on the impact violence has on the web 
of relationships that constitute us as persons. Simon 
Robins’s (2014) paper about the work of memory in rural 
Nepal explores a question also asked by Vella, among 
others: to what extent are the transitional justice models 
promoted by international organisations appropriate in 
culturally specific local contexts? Like Vella, Robins insists 
that post-conflict justice must be local and attentive to the 
needs of survivors and victims’ families.3
Robins’s research uncovers a tangle of competing social 
and political pressures generated by the forced disappear-
ances that took place during Nepal’s Maoist insurgency. 
His study is based on an intervention by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in 2010–11, which was 
3 This argument resonates with a growing con-
sensus among scholars writing about redress (see, 
for example, Vinck and Pham 2014).
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designed to promote victim-centred approaches to post-
conflict reparation. During the consultations with families 
of the disappeared about what they would regard as appro-
priate forms of reparation, it became clear that in the 
absence of knowing the truth about the fate of their 
relatives, families wanted the missing to be publicly mem-
orialised. The forms of commemoration chosen by families 
included the construction of objects in public places that 
were useful to the community but were also inscribed with 
the names of people who had been disappeared, and prayer 
ceremonies involving spiritual, social and political leaders 
and the local community. These objects and practices rec-
ord the fact of the disappearance and the ambiguity of the 
fate of the victim, and they reassert the value of the missing 
person and their family, thereby undoing some of the 
moral injury done by the act of disappearance.
The loss of the relationships in which we give and receive 
our identities becomes particularly difficult to navigate 
when the nature of that loss is itself ambiguous. In a case of 
forced disappearances, it is often unknown whether the 
disappeared is still alive. Is his surviving spouse a widow or 
a wife? For the surviving relatives, seeking an answer to 
such a question is part of the challenge of reconstructing a 
relationally defined identity when the nature of the lost 
relationship is unclear; the inability to determine the 
nature of the loss creates an ongoing instability around 
their identities and social standing. 
A society engaged in distancing itself from a period of con-
flict and violence has a strong interest in settling identities. 
Reparations, for example, require clearly identifiable vic-
tims. In the Nepalese context, the Maoist party has sought 
to resolve the ambiguity of the fate of the missing by iden-
tifying them collectively as martyrs for the Maoist struggle. 
However, this identification has had two implications for 
the surviving relatives: first, it has required them to accept 
the missing person as dead, usually in the absence of tan-
gible evidence or any account of how and when they died; 
second, this acceptance has led to a redefinition of their 
social identities within the local community – for a 
woman, this might mean the change of status from “wife” 
to “widow” along with significant changes to her living 
arrangements, autonomy and social standing.
Robins’s study highlights the way in which these mem-
orialisations have provided foci for the families of victims 
to assert their identities in the face of pressures to adopt 
particular locally or nationally prescribed social roles. In 
the absence of the victim of forced disappearance, the 
memorial becomes a substitute presence in the network of 
social relations, maintaining a testimony to the identity of 
the missing person within the local community and thus 
validating the survivors’ claims to an identity derived from 
their relation to the missing. The memorial thus functions 
as a limited proxy for the personhood of the missing per-
son, a signifier that takes up some of the function of the 
presence of the person in the trade of social recognition, 
and helps stabilise the identity of the family of the missing.
2. Outlook
Several conclusions can be drawn from the papers 
assembled in this focus section. The contributions by Era-
mian, Stockwell, Menin, Vella and Robins highlight the 
need to be attentive to the memories – and memory prac-
tices – of people directly or indirectly affected by historical 
injustices. In public debates about historical justice, we too 
easily assume that local communities, ethnic or religious 
groups, even states, are actors who remember, as if the fact 
that individual memories are refracted socially meant that 
social entities themselves remember. This is of course true 
in a metaphorical sense, but claims such as that “Turkey” 
refuses to label “the events of 1915” a genocide, and that 
“Armenia” and “the Armenian diaspora” demand the rec-
ognition and commemoration of the suffering of Arme-
nians massacred in 1915, can easily conceal more than they 
reveal. Thus in order to understand the legacy of the Arme-
nian genocide, we need to pay closer attention to how par-
ticular narratives are mobilised in the service of collective 
identity formation (for example, Anderson Paul 2000), and 
how narratives resonate within families: how individuals 
with relatives who were murdered in 1915 or who were 
among the killers, respond to the past (for example, Naguib 
2008; Azarian-Ceccato 2010; Üngör 2014).
Such attention to individual responses ought to take into 
account how violence severs relationships and thereby 
affects the selves of people who lost neighbours, friends 
and kin and as a result are forced to redefine their place in 
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the world and thus their personhood. Here, the work of 
memory plays a crucial role – but not just, as Eramian’s 
contribution reminds us, in the sense that the living strive 
to retain an albeit tenuous link to the dead by remem-
bering and commemorating them.
The idea that historical injustices need to be redressed and 
that wrongs and their victims ought to be remembered, has 
become a doxa in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) sense. Campisi 
criticises the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for 
naïvely ignoring the political implications of its decision to 
order Peru to add the names of victims who were members 
of Sendero Luminoso to a memorial in Lima. We would 
like to suggest that naïvety underpinned the court’s ruling 
in a more fundamental sense: in its recent focus on com-
memoration as a form of reparation, the court has failed to 
question assumptions about memory’s role and efficacy as 
an antidote that prevents the recurrence of injustice. In 
their motion condemning the Armenian genocide, the New 
South Wales parliamentarians recognised “the importance 
of remembering and learning from such dark chapters in 
human history to ensure that such crimes against 
humanity are not allowed to be repeated” (Parliament of 
New South Wales 1997, 7738). The confidence with which 
this and numerous similar statements are made is not sup-
ported by convincing evidence. In fact the history of the 
past seventy years strongly suggests that notwithstanding 
the global effort to remember the Holocaust, state and 
non-state actors have kept committing atrocities that bear 
some resemblance to the genocide of the early 1940s. The 
perpetration of genocides after the Holocaust does not 
prove that public remembrance is ineffectual, but it should 
make us wary of the refrain that societies learn from the 
past by commemorating its injustices.4
The papers draw attention to the selectivity of memories of 
injustice. The perspectives of articulate survivors who are 
able to frame their testimonies didactically (as Saoudi and 
El Bouih have done in Morocco) tend to have a dispropor-
tionately large bearing on public memories. Elie Wiesel and 
Primo Levi, for example, have had a significant influence 
on how the experience of the Holocaust is understood. 
Similarly, the disappearance of the Gelmans has shaped the 
discourse on the military dictatorship in Uruguay not 
because their case is typical, but because it is exceptional. 
The families of other desaparecidos may have been as per-
sistent in their attempts to establish the truth as Juan Gel-
man, but they were not able to take their case to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
In 2014, the Turkish prime minister tried to relativise the 
Armenian genocide by “pay[ing] tribute, with compassion 
and respect, to all Ottoman citizens who lost their lives in 
the same period and under similar conditions” (Republic 
of Turkey 2014). It could perhaps also be argued, however, 
that the injustices perpetrated against Assyrians, who were 
also subject to genocidal practices in the Ottoman Empire 
during the First World War (Gaunt 2006), have been over-
shadowed by the Armenian genocide. As Stockwell’s paper 
suggests, a consensus about historical justice in relation to 
particular aspects of a nation’s past may stymie the efforts 
of other victims to be recognised. However, here we 
quickly enter slippery terrain. Is there a moral obligation 
to seek historical justice for – and publicly remember – 
victims of political violence, irrespective of who they were, 
when they died and whether or not they were victims of 
state-sponsored crimes? Do Armenians have a more 
deserving case because there were about five times as 
many Armenian genocide victims, as there were Assyrian 
genocide victims? There are no easy answers to these ques-
tions. Scholars working with communities who experi-
enced gross human rights violations will, however, need to 
be aware that their work can be seen to validate the 
experiences of some over those of others, and that it is 
usually impossible to remain a neutral observer whose 
empathies are evenly divided between Hutu and Tutsi, 
between the victims of leftist terrorists and the victims of 
state terrorism, or between people from Guadalcanal and 
4 We may also want to stop taking statements 
about the purpose of memorials, and the motivation 
to create them, at face value; Laurie Beth Clark has 
made the compelling argument that “we will con-
tinue to build memory sites to past atrocities exactly 
because we still have ‘unrepresentable’ ongoing viol-
ence” (2011, 69).
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Malaitans. We would also like to suggest, however, that the 
focus on the experiences of individuals, which are often 
instrumentalised in the interest of sectarian, politically 
divisive or nationalistic narratives, provides a com-
paratively secure footing when scholars venture onto such 
slippery terrain.
In conclusion, we would like to emphasise the value of 
empirically-grounded studies that engage with the 
attempts of individuals to make their world habitable after 
they and their families and communities suffered violence5 
– without, however, wanting to deny the importance of 
studies that help us understand the broader social and 
political frameworks within which individual memories 
operate. Often the work of memory performed by individ-
uals cannot be easily accounted for in narratives that focus 
on social and public memories, or privilege discourses over 
experience and affects. Sometimes that work also defies 
attempts to arrive at generalisations; what is true for Solo-
mon Islands may not be true for Nepal, and conclusions 
drawn on the basis of research in Rwanda may not help us 
to understand the dynamics of remembrance and redress 
in Morocco.6 Similarly, theoretical models that work well in 
one, historically and culturally specific, context may have 
little explanatory value elsewhere. However, we believe the 
projects featured in this focus section demonstrate how 
much we can learn from attending closely to the interplay 
between individual memories and affects, the search for 
justice, and the politics of the past at a national or inter-
national scale.
5 For a recent exemplary study, see Theidon 2013.
6 This point has been convincingly made in 
relation to the practices of transitional justice (Shaw 
and Waldorf 2010; see also Mani 2002, chapter 4).
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